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Abstract 
This s tudy inves t igates whether  f i sca l  pol icy  is  able  to affec t  the  trend of  
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countr ie s ,  cover ing the  per iod 1980 -2009 with annual  da ta .  The ef fects  of  
f isca l  po l icy  are  es t imated with a  SVAR, where  the  exogenous f i sca l  s hock 
is  ident i f ied  employ ing a  recent datase t  prov ided by the  IMF, conta ining  
prede termined f i sca l  po l icy  changes  due to f i sca l  consol ida t ion i ssues .  My  
resul t s  suggest  that  a  f isca l  shock can mod ify  the  employment equi l ibr ium 
leve l  even wi thout  inf luenc in g potent i a l  ou tput .  The f i sca l  mul t ipl ier  for  
the  employment ra te  trend af te r  two year s  i s  -0 .55 and  accounts  for  a lmost  
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whi le  tax effec ts  are  larger  on rea l  pe r  cap i ta  GDP. Such a  re su l t  may be 
expla ined  by  d if ferent  react ions of  monetary  pol icy .  The evidence 
advocates tha t  the  mult ip l ier  i s  s ta te -dependent ,  i .e .  la rger  dur ing 
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Abstract 
This study investigates whether fiscal policy is able to affect the trend of employment rate, triggering hysteresis 
independently from GDP behavior. I attempt to shed a light on this issue analyzing a Panel of 17 OECD countries, 
covering the period 1980-2009 with annual data. The effects of fiscal policy are estimated with a SVAR, where the 
exogenous fiscal shock is identified employing a recent dataset provided by the IMF, containing predetermined fiscal 
policy changes due to fiscal consolidation issues. My results suggest that a fiscal shock can modify the employment 
equilibrium level even without influencing potential output. The fiscal multiplier for the employment rate trend after 
two years is -0.55 and accounts for almost half of the multiplier for overall employment rate (which is -1.10), while 
is -0.11 – and not significant – for the potential output. The multiplier for the real per capita GDP is -1.04, which 
sharply contrasts with the “expansionary austerity” hypothesis. Various extensions are presented, considering the 
role of composition, monetary policy, and state-dependency. Spending cuts affect employment more than tax 
increases, while tax effects are larger on real per capita GDP. Such a result may be explained by different reactions 
of monetary policy. The evidence advocates that the multiplier is state-dependent, i.e. larger during recessions, and 
such effect is stronger on employment trend. 
 
Keywords: fiscal policy, labor market, narrative approach, panel data, hysteresis 
JEL Classification: C23, E24, E62 
                                                 
1 Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Economic Department 
  
II 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Today, an increasing amount of research focuses on the conditions making fiscal policy more effective, 
thereby busting the economy recovery. This study tries to answer a slightly different question, that is 
whether fiscal policy can modify the economy equilibrium. To this end, it presents new empirical evidence 
on how fiscal policy affects the labor market in the long-term. Therefore, the study extends the literature 
on hysteresis followed from Blanchard and Summers (1986) seminal paper, where hysteresis is generate 
by supply side mechanism or frictions in the labor market (De Jong and Summers 2012), investigating 
whether also a demand shock – as a change in fiscal policy – is able to affect the employment equilibrium 
level. 
The analysis of labor market response to fiscal shocks is attractive for both theoretical and empirical 
reasons. On the theoretical side, two branches of research are expanding: on one hand, a number of 
models (Campolmi, Faia and Winkler 2011; Cantore, Levine, and Melina 2013; Faia, Lechthaler and Merkl 
2013; Gnocchi, Hauser and Pappa 2012; Michaillat 2014) are now trying to explain the role of labor market 
in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. On the other hand, scholars are still looking for an 
explanation of the jobless recovery puzzle (Galì, Smets and Wouters 2012; Gordon 2010; Riggi 2010; 
Shimer 2010).  
From an empirical point of view, since many fiscal packages are intended to positively affect the 
employment rate, policy makers need a better framework to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy on the 
job creation process. However, the largest part of the recent literature has focused on the fiscal multiplier 
estimation for GDP (Auerbach Gorodnichenko 2011, Corsetti, Meier and Muller 2012, Michaillat 2012a/b). 
Furthermore, the few works that estimates the fiscal policy effects on labor market focuses only on the 
cyclical component of unemployment (Monacelli et al. 2010; Bruckner and Pappa 2012; and Turrini 2013), 
in spite of the importance of hysteresis to evaluate correctly the effect of a demand shock. 
The literature have broadly discussed two different channels through which fiscal shock influences job 
creation. The first is the well-known Okun’s law, which predicts a strong and negative relation between 
the business cycle and the cyclical component of unemployment rate (Okun, 1962). Scholars have 
estimated this relation: Mankiw (2012) found that a one percent deviation of output from its potential 
causes an opposite change of half a percentage point in unemployment. Ball, Leigh and Loungani (2013) 
checked the validity of the Okun’s law on a panel of several countries, pointing out that the value of the 
estimated coefficients strongly depends on the idiosyncratic component of labor market. 
The second relation follows from Blanchard and Summers (1986)’s seminal paper and successive 
extensions (1987a, 1987b), which argued that changes in unemployment equilibrium levels are due to a 
wage bargaining process with insiders and outsiders, which entails hysteresis in unemployment behavior. 
The presence hysteresis implies that movements in the cyclical component of unemployment – which are 
linked to the GDP behavior through the Okun’s law – can affect the unemployment trend, changing nature 
of unemployment from frictional to structural. In other words, a part of the actual variation of 
unemployment becomes persistent, leading to a change in the equilibrium level of employment (Delong 
and Summers, 2012)2. 
The presence of hysteresis has remarkable consequences on the economy behavior, for instance 
amplifying and prolonging the effects of recessions. Bagaria, Holland and Van Reenen (2012) shows that 
hysteresis can keep the productive capacity of the economy persistently low. Consequently, the economy 
may converge to the steady state levels of output and employment in the very long-run, while in the 
medium term, those levels are substantially lower than without hysteresis. As a result, crises effects are 
larger and longer in presence of hysteresis, in agreement with Phelps (1972), who argued that there are 
reasons to believe that the crises impose costs even after they end. In addition, when the fiscal shock 
affects the equilibrium level of unemployment, the analyses on unemployment cyclical component suffer 
of estimation concerns, determining unreliable results. First, if a fraction of the cyclical unemployment 
                                                 
2 For a review of the mechanism which can lead to the hysteresis, see Delong and Summers (2012) 
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becomes structural, the impact of fiscal shocks on labor market is underestimated considering only the 
unemployment cyclical component. Second, taking into account the equilibrium level of unemployment, 
researchers can better evaluate the persistency of the fiscal policy effects. 
Following Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014), this study uses a SVAR to estimate the relation 
between fiscal policy and employment trend. In the presented model, the possible information shortage 
to identify a true unexpected fiscal shock (Lütkepohl 2012) is overcame employing information from a 
recent dataset of exogenous fiscal shock from the IMF (Devries et al. 2011). The dataset, following Romer 
and Romer (2010)’s narrative approach, retains the changes in tax level and public expenditure from fiscal 
consolidation, which are independent to current economic development (i.e. predetermined, see 
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori 2014). An additional strength of the study is that, relying on Panel data, it 
does not suffer of the drawbacks due to the time series length. The role of business cycle is evaluated 
with dynamic Panel regressions, in which the specifications are enriched with the NBER-based dummy 
from the FRED database, which takes value equal 1 when a crisis occurs. 
The empirical evidence presented not only confirms the presence of hysteresis in the employment 
rate, but also suggests that a fiscal shock is able to change the employment equilibrium level even without 
influencing potential output – confirming the presence of a true hysteresis process assumed by Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) and Delong and Summers (2012). As a consequence, the statistical inference based 
on the cyclical component of unemployment would lead to an incorrect interpretation of the relation 
between labor market and fiscal policy. The estimated fiscal multiplier of a negative fiscal shock – i.e. a 
reduction in public expenditure or an increase in taxation level – for the employment rate trend is -0.55 
after two years and accounts for almost half of the multiplier for overall employment rate, which is 1.10, 
while is -0.11 – and not significant – for the potential output. The multiplier for the real per capita GDP is 
-1.04, which sharply contrasts with the “expansionary austerity” hypothesis (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990 & 
1996; Alesina and Ardagna 2010).  
Various extensions are offered. First, I consider the effects of composition, distinguishing between the 
effects of a spending cut from the effects of a raise in tax level. In agreement with recent evidence in other 
studies (Barro and Redlick 2011; Bermperoglou, Pappa, and Vella 2013; Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa 
2009), the evidence supports that spending cuts affect employment more than tax increases, while 
changes in tax levels are more effective on real per capita GDP. Second, I analyze the role of monetary 
policy, which has a different reaction between the fiscal policy tools. Monetary policy seems to be more 
expansionary after a spending cut, implying that central bankers interpret this policy as more credible. 
Consequently, an expansionary monetary policy may offset the effects of spending cuts on GDP, 
explaining the low GDP response to a reduction of public expenditure. Finally, I explored if multipliers are 
state-dependent, i.e. larger during recessions: the evidence suggest that in general this is true, confirming 
the findings in the related literature (Auerbach Gorodnichenko 2011, Corsetti, Meier and Muller 2012, 
Michaillat 2012a/b). Such effect seem to be stronger for employment trend.  
The article is organized as follows. Next section sum-up the transmission channels of fiscal policy on 
output and employment. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy, while section 4 describes the dataset 
and the methodology. Section 5 discusses the main results. In section 6, conclusions are provided. Some 
robustness checks and a deeper analysis of the dataset is reported in the Appendix. 
2. LABOR MAKET AND FISCAL POLICY 
The study focus on whether a fiscal shock can modify the equilibrium level of employment, testing for 
the presence of a hysteresis process in the employment behavior. To this aim, my study presents a 
measure of employment equilibrium level and estimates the effects of fiscal shocks on both the 
equilibrium and cyclical components of the employment rate. This empirical framework should allow me 
to make important considerations on the presence of hysteresis and on its nature and consequences for 
the fiscal policy choice. The final end is to understand if the temporary reduction in employment level 
produced by fiscal consolidation is likely to become structural, i.e. if a negative fiscal shock can trigger the 
so-called hysteresis process (Blanchard and Summers 1986). 
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Fiscal consolidation have at least two effects on the economy. The first is the classical Keynesian effect: 
a contractionary fiscal policy – a cut of public expenditure or an increase of the tax rates – reduces the 
aggregate demand, lowering investment, consumption, and employment. If the agents interpret the fiscal 
shock as temporary, the economy will return to pre-shock level of employment and production once that 
fiscal policy ends. If the shock is permanent, a fiscal contraction may affect the equilibrium of the economy 
depending on whether the private sector is able to fill the room left by the reduction of the public sector 
boundaries. However, since a fiscal consolidation reduces the public debt, under the assumptions of 
rationality and complete information the agents increase both actual consumption and investment, 
anticipating the cut of tax in the future – this is the Ricardian equivalence –. This mechanism is the root 
of the so-called “expansionary austerity” (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990 & 1996, Alesina and Ardagna 2010).  
However, other essential aspects have to be taken into account. First, the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
depends also on how the monetary authority behaves, i.e. if it “accommodates”, or “sterilizes”, fiscal 
policy. A fiscal shock may affect the nominal interest rate: a cut in the government deficit, reducing 
aggregate demand – or lowering the sovereign risk –, pushes downward the nominal interest rate. If the 
monetary policy is accommodative, it will push interest rates even lower, stimulating aggregate demand 
and reducing the depressive effects of fiscal consolidation. Second, the strength of a fiscal shock may vary 
along the business cycle. As a number of studies have underlined (Auerbach Gorodnichenko 2011; Baum, 
Popolaski-Ribeiro, and Weber 2012; Corsetti, Meier and Muller 2012; Michaillat 2012a/b) a fiscal shock 
has larger effects on output during downturn, implying a larger multiplier also for employment during 
recessions. Indeed, when the output is below its potential, there is room to raise the endowment of 
factors without increasing wage levels or capital remuneration, which would increase inflation, 
dampening the growth. Third, in agreement with Barro and Redlick (2011), Bermperoglou, Pappa and 
Vella (2013), and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), I expect that the effectiveness of a fiscal policy 
depends on the type of policy. 
The presence of different links between labor market and fiscal policy raises a number of 
methodological concerns. Primarily, unemployment rate is not the ideal variable to use in studies that 
wish to isolate the effect of fiscal shocks on job creation. The fact that the unemployment rate is the share 
of the difference between labor force and employment on the labor force raises both theoretical and 
empirical issues: on the theoretical side, labor force can be considered as a proxy of labor supply (labor 
supply is equal to the number of persons who are looking for a job).  On the empirical side, GDP affects 
the level of labor force since unemployed people become discouraged and exit from the labor force during 
recessionary period (Barnichon and Figura 2010, Bruckner and Pappa 2012, Delong and Summers 2012). 
This responsiveness of labor force to the business cycle may bias the estimation of the effects of the fiscal 
shock: on one hand, the presence in the unemployment rate of a pure labor supply component leads to 
unclear results respect to the ability of fiscal policy to create new jobs. On the other hand, labor force 
movements in the medium-run are likely to offset hysteresis. In order to address these issues, I adopted 
the employment rate as dependent variable, since it has population as denominator – which is 
independent from the business cycle, at least in the considered period –, avoiding any bias due to the 
presence of a labor supply proxy. 
This study proposes a comparative analysis of fiscal policy effects on employment and output, which 
is a crucial exercise to determine whether a fiscal policy is able to trigger the hysteresis process. Indeed, 
fiscal policy effects on employment trend may be due to a modification of the potential output. In this 
case, it is the shift in potential output that entails the change in employment trend: this type of relation 
can be confused with the hysteresis process, but it is not. The hysteresis process à la Blanchard and 
Summers (1986) is present only when fiscal shocks impact the employment trend without modifying the 
potential output level. In this case, the employment rate may be sluggish even if the economy starts the 
recovery after the negative demand shock.  
The presence of hysteresis would have a number on implication on both theoretical and applied 
analysis. For instance, this transmission mechanism would be an important explanation to the “jobless 
recovery” of the 90s (Galì, Smets and Wouters 2012; Gordon 2010; Riggi 2010; Shimer 2010). If a demand 
shock has an impact on the employment equilibrium level (hysteresis), even after the complete output 
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recovery the employment will not restore to the pre-shock level. In addition, if the results are coherent 
with the “hysteresis hypothesis”, the empirical studies on the cyclical component of 
employment/unemployment are not reliable. Indeed, if an empirical investigation does not consider that 
fiscal shocks modify also the trend component, focusing only in the cyclical component it will 
underestimate the overall effects of the shock on jobs creation. 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Table 1 reports the list of variable and parameters used in this section. The study estimates three 
types of relations between fiscal policy and employment. The first expresses the effect of fiscal policy on 
employment rate growth. It follows from the impact of fiscal policy on output growth, the so-called “fiscal 
multiplier” (see Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler 2009 for a review).  
Table 1 
List of variables and parameters 
𝑮𝒕 Change in primary balance 𝜸 elasticity of real GDP to capital – assumed between 0 and 1 – 
𝒀𝒕 real GDP per capita 1-𝛾 elasticity of real GDP to labor – assumed between 0 and 1 – 
𝑬𝒕 employment 𝜗 fiscal multiplier of real GDP 
𝑲𝒕 capital 𝛽 effect of a variation of cyclical unemployment on output 
𝑨𝒕 technology 𝛽𝑒 
effect of a variation of cyclical employment on output 𝛽𝑒 =
𝛽
𝑃
𝐿
 
𝑳𝒕 labor force 𝜑 effect of fiscal policy on the output gap 
𝑷𝒕 population 𝛿 
weight of past cyclical employment on current employment – 
hysteresis coefficient – 
𝒖𝒕 unemployment rate computed as 
𝐿𝑡−𝐸𝑡
𝐿𝑡
 𝑥∗ indicates the equilibrium (or potential) level of the x variable 
Notes. All the variables are expressed in absolute values and at time t. In the text, the lowercase indicates natural logarithm, the stars the natural  - or potential – 
levels, and the hats the growth rates. 
 
The effect of a fiscal shock on output growth can be written as: 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝜗?̂?𝑡            (1) 
Where ?̂?𝑡 is the real per capita output growth and 𝑔𝑡 is the fiscal shock, i.e. the variation of the primary 
balance – or, if considered per se, the change in public expenditure or taxation – as a percentage of GDP. 
Converting the GDP and the fiscal policy in the same unit before the estimation I avoid an important bias 
of the SVAR methodology in recovering the multiplier (Hall 2009; Barro and Redlick 2011; Ramey and 
Zubairy 2014). Indeed: 
?̂?𝑡 =
𝐺𝑡+1−𝐺𝑡
𝑌𝑡
≈ (ln 𝐺𝑡+1 − ln 𝐺𝑡)
𝐺𝑡
𝑌𝑡
        (2) 
The quantity in (2) has the remarkable advantage to convert the percentage change to dollar change 
using the value 𝐺/𝑌 at each point in time. Consequently, the coefficients from the 𝑌 equations are in the 
same unit as those from the 𝐺 equation (notably, all fiscal policy variables are in terms of GDP in this 
research). As Ramey and Zubairy (forthcoming) pointed out, this measure would potentially suffer for 
some econometric drawbacks. Indeed, the measurement error in 𝑌𝑡 induces biases since it appears as 
denominator in both the fiscal shock and GDP growth rates, in particular if one is interested to recover 
the state-dependent multiplier. This suggest checking the robustness of the estimation using a different 
denominator as potential output (this exercise is reported in the Appendix and my results seem to be 
robust to this change in the denominator). 
Assuming that the aggregate production function is a Cobb-Douglas, that is: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛾𝐸𝑡
1−𝛾
          (3) 
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Taking logs and assuming no technological shock between time 𝑡 − 1 and time 𝑡, (i.e. 𝐴𝑡−1 = 𝐴𝑡), I 
obtain that: 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝛾?̂?𝑡 + (1 − 𝛾)?̂?𝑡         (4) 
Hence, rearranging terms and recalling that for small distance the logarithmic difference is equal to 
the percentage growth, I obtain that: 
?̂?𝑡 =
1
1−𝛾
?̂?𝑡           (5) 
Which, using (1) becomes: 
?̂?𝑡 =
𝜗
1−𝛾
?̂?𝑡           (6) 
Where 𝜗 1 − 𝛾⁄  is the effect of a fiscal shock on the employment rate growth. Notably, since 1 − 𝛾 is 
less than one, the multiplier of the employment rate is expected to be greater than the one for the output 
growth and to depend on the business cycle. Therefore, during downturns, I rely on larger effects of 
shocks on output and even larger effects on employment rate. 
The second type of relation between labor and fiscal shock is the one described using the Okun’s law, 
recently estimated by Ball, Leigh, and Loungani (2013) and Turrini (2013), i.e.: 
𝑦𝑡
𝑐 = −𝛽(𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡
∗)          (7) 
Where ?̂?𝑡
𝑐 is the output gap3 and 𝑢∗ is the Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU)4, 
obtained by using the Kalman filter on the relative Phillips Curve. Therefore, the NAIRU can be interpreted 
as a measure of both long-term and equilibrium level of unemployment5. 
I can rewrite this relation using the employment rate, obtaining: 
𝑦𝑡
𝑐 = 𝛽𝑒(𝑒𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡
∗)           (8) 
𝑒𝑡
∗ is the “NAIRE” (Non Accelerating Inflation Employment Rate). The NAIRE6 is my measure of the 
equilibrium level of employment rate, and it is obtained using the formula: 
𝑒𝑡
∗ =
𝐿𝑡−𝑢𝑡
∗𝐿𝑡
𝑃𝑡
            (9) 
By using (9) it is possible that a fraction of labor force volatility is transferred to my measure of 
employment equilibrium. Therefore, future researches should refine this measure of employment 
equilibrium level, applying a filter directly on employment rate.  
Using equation (9) and defining the interaction between fiscal policy and the output gap as: 
                                                 
3 Computed as (𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄  
4 The NAIRU can be defined as the level of unemployment to which the economy tends to adjust after a supply shock or a policy 
intervention (Turner, Boone, Giorno, Meacci, Rae, and Richardson 2001; Guichard and Rusticelli 2011) along a given Phillips 
curve. The combined action of structural breaks and expectations contained in the Phillips curve equation can change the value of 
the NAIRU, so the estimation technique allows for time-varying levels of it. The largest part of the studies to retrieve a time-
varying measure of the NAIRU apply a Kalman filter to a Phillips curve model (Guichard and Rusticelli 2011). However, as 
Dickens (2009) highlights, the complicated relations among inflation, its own lags, supply shocks, unemployment and its lagged 
values lead to a lack of robust results and to large confidence intervals around the NAIRU. 
5 This is why, from now on, the terms “equilibrium” and “long-term” will be used as synonyms. 
6 A measure of potential employment is contained in the OECD Economic Outlook Database. However, the starting year is 1985 
(or later for some countries like Germany and Ireland), so that a large number of observations would be lost by using such a 
measure. 
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𝑦𝑡
𝑐 = 𝜑?̂?𝑡           (10) 
We obtain: 
𝑒𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡
∗ =
𝜑
𝛽𝑒
?̂?𝑡          (11) 
Where the stars indicate the potential (or natural) values of the variables, 𝜑 is the effect of fiscal policy 
on the output gap – which should be sizable different from 𝜗 –, and 𝜑 𝛽𝑒⁄  represents the fiscal multiplier 
of cyclical employment rate. Recent studies estimated a similar coefficient for the cyclical component of 
the unemployment (Ball, Leigh, and Loungani 2013, Turrini 2013).  
In absence of hysteresis, the fiscal shock would affect only the cyclical component of employment. 
However, we must also consider that fiscal shocks may influence the trend component of employment 
through hysteresis and output trend shifts, i.e. 𝑒𝑡
∗ depends on time and cycles, as the subscript 𝑡 indicates. 
This implies that the inference based on the estimation of 𝜑 𝛽𝑒⁄  would be unreliable because both the 
impact of a fiscal shock on the cyclical employment and the persistency of the shock effects would be 
underestimated – or overestimated –. 
The size of this distortion, and the persistency of the shock, is retrieved estimating the relation 
between fiscal policy and employment trend. Following Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987ab), the 
hysteresis relation may be described adopting a simple aggregate equation for the long-run employment: 
𝑒𝑡
∗ = (1 − 𝛿)𝑒𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛿𝑒𝑡−1         (12) 
In equation (12), the NAIRE component of employment rate depends on its past value for a fraction 
(1 − 𝛿) and on the past values of the cyclical component for a fraction 𝛿. Rearranging the terms and using 
(11), I obtain equation (13) for the effects of fiscal policy on employment trend: 
𝑒𝑡
∗ − 𝑒𝑡−1
∗ = 𝛿
𝜑
𝛽𝑒
?̂?𝑡−1         (13) 
Where (𝛿 ∗ 𝜑) 𝛽𝑒⁄  represents the effects of the fiscal shock on the difference between the equilibrium 
level of employment rate at time  𝑡 and at time 𝑡 − 1. Given that it is hard to interpret such a parameter, 
it is more convenient to obtain an elasticity measure by computing the effect of a fiscal shock on the 
growth of the NAIRE. Hence: 
?̂?𝑡
∗ = 𝜃?̂?𝑡−1           (14) 
Where 
𝜃 =
𝛿
𝑒𝑡−1
∗
𝜑
𝛽𝑒
           (15) 
𝜃 may be interpreted as the elasticity of employment trend to a fiscal policy change. The effect of a 
fiscal shock on NAIRE is equal to the effect on the cyclical component 𝜑 𝛽𝑒⁄  multiplied for a coefficient 𝛿, 
where 0 < 𝛿 < 1. (𝛿 ∗ 𝜑) 𝛽𝑒⁄  is not expected to be significant for a large number of periods, since its 
value decreases exponentially7. This means that once shocked the NAIRE moves toward a new 
equilibrium. In addition, fiscal shock affects structural employment only after one period. However, the 
analysis would not retrieve the presence of this lag given both the nature of the data, which are annual, 
and the presence of rational agents. 
                                                 
7 for at time 𝑡 − 𝑠 lag of the fiscal shock will be 𝛿𝑠
𝜑
𝛽𝑒
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4. DATASET AND IDENTIFICATION 
The analysis is conducted on a Panel of 17 OECD countries (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, 
US), using annual data from 1980 to 2010. The data are collected using different sources: a dataset 
provided by the IMF (Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori 2011, which is extensively analyzed in 
Appendix) provides information on consolidation fiscal policies8. The employment rate and the variables 
for the estimation of its natural level are from the OECD database, excluding Germany and Ireland for 
which a sufficiently long time series was unavailable. For these two countries, I exploited the data from 
the AMECO dataset, then: first, I used the NAWRU instead of the NAIRU as measure of unemployment 
equilibrium9. Second, for Germany the observations for employment and labor force until 1990 were 
retrieved from the data on West Germany. Third, for Ireland, the employment rate until 1995 was 
estimated using data on unemployment rate, labor force, and population.  
Figure 1 Output Gap (solid line, right scale) and NBER based recession indicator (grey areas, left scale) 
 
Notes. The figure reports the output gap with solid lines, and with a grey bar the years in which the NBER indicator assumes value equal one (i.e. a crisis is 
occurring). Data are from NBER (NBER indicator) and IMF World Economic Outlook database (output gap). As time indicator, the figures report from 
1=1980 to 31=2010. 
In order to measure the business cycle I opted for the business cycle indicator from the FRED dataset, 
which considers the behavior of several variables to compute a recession dummy. Therefore, this should 
signal in a more complete and precise fashion the business cycle phases than other indicators as the 
output gap. The dummy is reported in Figure 1, where grey areas are crises periods as detected by NBER 
method, compared with the output gap behavior (reported in inverse scale). As it is possible to see, the 
two variables do not always coincide. The multidimensional nature of the links between fiscal shocks and 
                                                 
8 Since the construction of this variable follows the narrative approach from Romer and Romer 2010, I will refer to it also as 
“narrative fiscal variable” 
9 The NAWRU is computed by the EU Commission while the NAIRU is computed by OECD and IMF. The main differences is 
that the former estimates the level of unemployment that does not accelerate the change in wages level, while the latter calculates 
the level of unemployment which does not accelerate inflation. 
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business cycle is taken into account through an interaction variable between the shocks and the business 
cycle.10 
 
Following Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2013), the equation to estimate the unrestricted VAR is:  
𝒚𝑖𝑡 = 𝒇𝑖 + 𝜹𝑡 + ∑ 𝒚𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝚽𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=1 + 𝒖𝑖𝑡        (16) 
In (16) subscripts 𝑖 indexes country and 𝑡 indexes years. 𝒚𝑖𝑡 is the vector of dependent variables (fiscal 
policy, real GDP per capita, and employment rate),  𝒚𝑖𝑡−𝑠 is the matrix containing all the variable lagged 
for 𝑠 periods, 𝚽𝑡−𝑠 is the matrix of coefficients for the correspondent lagged vector of regressors, 𝒇𝑖 is 
the vector of fixed effect for country 𝑖 and 𝜹𝑡 is the vector of time dummies. 𝒖𝑖𝑡  is the vector of error 
terms. The number of lags is chosen using the AIC. The VAR estimation is repeated for all the three 
dependent variables (growth rates, deviation from the equilibrium rate, trend growth rates). 
By and large, my methodology consists in demeaning each cross-sectional unit: doing that, I can treat 
my panel VAR as a stacked time series. Roughly speaking, I deal with my panel as it is a unique time-series 
of 527 observations from a single country. This procedure has two noteworthy shortcomings: first, since 
I transformed the data as if they come from one country, I lose all the cross-sectional information. 
Therefore, I cannot enrich the analysis modeling the cross-countries relations. Second, using fixed effect 
I impose that the underlining structure of the economies is the same. This would bias the results on the 
shock persistency, in particular when the time-series dimension is small. The use of a GMM or IV 
estimation would be a good approach to overcome such limit (Assenmacher-Welshe and Gerlach 2008), 
and this is exactly what is done in this paper, identifying the structural shock in the SVAR analysis via the 
dataset of predetermined fiscal policy. 
The identification of the structural shocks is the central issue in the SVAR methodology. Indeed, as a 
huge literature pointed out, the covariance between the residuals in (16) is non-null, i.e. the variance-
covariance matrix is not diagonal. Instead, it is desirable that a shock affecting the economy is not 
correlated with the other shocks. This type of shocks is also called structural shock, and produces its 
effects on the variables of the system only through the matrix 𝚽𝑡−𝑠. I can think that the structural shocks 
are directly related to the unrestricted VAR vector of residuals with a matrix 𝑩 of restrictions, i.e.: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡, = 𝐁𝒆𝑖𝑡           (17) 
Where 𝒆𝑖𝑡 is my vector of structural shocks, i.i.d. and normally distributed. The only information set 
from which retrieve the matrix 𝑩 is the variance-covariance matrix of residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑡, which is not sufficient 
to identify the structural shocks because it is symmetric: as a consequence, I can have several matrices 𝑩 
respecting the equivalence in (17). In order to identify uniquely 𝑩 I need 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 additional 
restrictions. Broadly speaking, in the literature there are two main approaches to retrieve these 
restrictions: one is to use the Cholesky decomposition, i.e. premultiplying (16) by the lower triangular of 
the ?̂?𝑖𝑡variance-covariance matrix, or restricting 𝑩 based on economics assumptions, as in Blanchard and 
Quah (1989).  
However, both techniques have drawbacks: the Cholesky decomposition is an atheoretical method 
but imposes a recursive form to the SVAR. As a consequence, the results will highly depend on the 
variables ordering. On the other hand, imposing restrictions on 𝑩 using theoretical hypothesis is in 
contrast with the idea behind the VAR approach, which is to impose the smallest number of theoretical 
assumptions to the model. Moreover, as Lütkepohl (2012) pointed out, the identification method does 
not lead necessarily to retrieve a fundamental shock. This is because the number of variables on which 
                                                 
10 Further information at the FRED webpage http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32262. I choose the midpoint 
interpretation to date a recession, which includes both the peak and the though within the recessionary period. As the St. Louis Fed 
reports, the dummy variable for recessions is grounded on an interpretation of the OECD Composite Leading Indicators: Reference 
Turning Points and Component Series data. Additional information on this indicators can be found at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3746,en_2649_34349_35726918_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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agents form their expectations is usually much larger than the variables contained in a SVAR: therefore, 
the variables to which I regress the fiscal policy are not enough to clean this from all the agent 
expectations. In this case, the residual I get will be an anticipated shock (Mertens and Ravn 2010): the 
estimation of the shocks effects are biased if agents anticipate a component of the shock, and the IRF are 
not consistent. Lütkepohl (2012) propose two possible alternative approaches to deal with this problem: 
enlarging the number of variables in the VAR, or using a FAVAR. 
This study explores another way to deal with this concern, which is directly related with Ramey (2011), 
Mertens and Ravn (2014), and Ramey and Zubairy (forthcoming), and should allow me to have more 
reliable estimation of the effects of a fiscal policy11. Following Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2013, from 
now on GLP), I use the dataset of predetermined changes in fiscal policy as an instrumental variable for 
the changes in the Cyclical Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) of government, which is usually the 
benchmark variable for the analysis on the short-term effects of fiscal policy (see Alesina and Ardagna 
2010, AA from now on). In this way, the anticipated component of estimated residual in (16) should be 
lower respect to the one derived from the usual VAR. Then, the IRF are less biased and more reliable. 
Unfortunately, such a procedure implies a growth of the standard errors (since I am instrumenting a 
variable), leading to larger confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2 News in employment vs narrative shock 
 
Notes. The figure reports the narrative shock measure compared with the behavior of the Employment News variable, computed as the difference between actual 
employment rate the forecasted level for t at t-1, and scaling the difference for the level forecasted at t-1. Forecasts are from the OECD Outlook. Data from 1985 
to 2010. 
Three factors assure that the residual from this methodology, and then the structural shock12, are 
nearer to the forecast error of agents than other structural shock identified in the literature. First, fiscal 
policy can be anticipated because of the time passing between the announcement of the fiscal policy and 
its implementation, which usually takes two or three quarters. Therefore, the use of yearly data should 
avoid this type anticipation. Moreover, it is easier to predict what will happen in the next quarter, while 
                                                 
11 A good review of the former methodologies to deal with the endogeneity issue to estimate fiscal policy effectiveness is contained 
in Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming). 
12 For the first variable in a ordered SVAR, shock and residual are proportional 
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what is going to occur next year is more uncertain. Second, my narrative variable is predetermined, since 
it is orthogonal respect to contemporaneous movements in output and employment. Third, the narrative 
variable enters in the VAR: then the shock is the residual of the change in the consolidation policy 
regressed for some lag of output, employment, and CAPB. This procedure gives an instrument that is 
uncorrelated with the previous economic behaviors. In addition, the changes in fiscal policy are usually 
permanent. In the case of temporary fiscal changes, the end of the consolidation policy is reported as a 
negative shock. 
Figure 3 News in GDP vs narrative shock 
 
Notes. The figure reports the narrative shock measure compared with the behavior of the GDP News variable, computed as the difference between actual GDP 
rate the forecasted level for t at t-1, and scaling the difference for the level forecasted at t-1. Forecasts are from the IMF World Economic Outlook. Data from 1990 
to 2010. 
Table 2 
Testing the orthogonality of fiscal policy changes to news on employment rate 
Equation estimated: Δ𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Measure of Δ𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝛽 s.e. Obs R-squared 
Narrative Fiscal Shock -0.10 (0.07) 405 0.159 
Change in CAPB OECD 1.06 (0.64) 406 0.275 
Change in CAPB AA 1.44** (0.61) 405 0.406 
Notes. The table reports point estimates and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. All specifications contain full set of country and time fixed effects. Dateset 
1990-2010  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
A test of the narrative variable orthogonality respect to contemporaneous movement of output and 
employment can be implemented constructing a measure of “news” in GDP and employment based on 
the contemporaneous revisions to the IMF (for GDP, data covering 1990-2010) and OECD (for employment 
rate, data covering 1985-2010) forecasts. The two measures for employment and GDP are compared in 
Figures 2 and 3. The test creates a “news” variable subtracting from time 𝑡 GDP or employment rate the 
forecasted level for 𝑡 at 𝑡 − 1, while scaling the difference for the level forecasted at 𝑡 − 1. Then, the 
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obtained news measure is regressed on the CAPB and the narrative shock13. Table 2 and 3 reports the 
result for this test: as it is shown, both the CAPB measure, from OECD and AA are strongly correlated with 
the contemporaneous output (Table 3), and with contemporaneous changes employment rate (Table 2). 
Hence, this preliminary analysis confirms that the changes in government budget identified by the IMF 
dataset are predetermined. 
Table 3 
Testing the orthogonality of fiscal policy changes to news on GDP 
Equation estimated: Δ𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
 
Measure of Δ𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝛽 s.e. Obs R-squared 
Narrative Fiscal Shock -0.07 (0.07) 406 0.159 
Change in CAPB OECD 0.22* (0.11) 322 0.304 
Change in CAPB AA 0.34*** (0.08) 321 0.447 
Notes. The table reports point estimates and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. All specifications contain full set of country and time fixed effects. Dataset 
1985-2010  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In a second step of the study, I extended the analysis exploring whether the relations between fiscal 
policy and the economy are state dependent. In order to do that, I present a simple dynamic panel data 
analysis, where the fiscal policy variable, the CAPB, is instrumented with the IMF variables. In order to 
introduce some elements of non-linearity, I augment the model with the interaction variables between 
fiscal policy and the state of the economy. This extension is directly related with recent findings on the 
fiscal multiplier estimation (for instance, Auerback and Gorodnichenko 2012), which legitimate me to 
expect a remarkable difference between coefficients estimated during crises and normal times. The 
estimated model will be: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ ∆𝑔𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝛼𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=0 + ∑ ∆𝑔𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜃𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=0 + ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝛿𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=1 + 𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑑𝑡𝛽3 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 (18) 
Each variable observation refers to a country 𝑖 and a time 𝑡. In (18), 𝑦𝑖𝑡  represents one of my 
dependent variables, while on the right hand side ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=1   are the 𝑠 lags necessary to address the data 
generating process (DGP) issues, while 𝛿𝑡−𝑠 is the coefficient specific for each lag. ∑ ∆𝑔𝑖𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=0  is the fiscal 
policy variable and its 𝑠 lags, with 𝛼𝑡−𝑠 as the time-specific multiplier. 𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the recession index, 𝑖𝑖𝑡 is the 
short term interest rate, while 𝛽1,  𝛽2 are the correspondent coefficients. ∑ ∆𝑔𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑠
𝑇
𝑠=0  is the 
interaction variable between the fiscal policy (and its 𝑠 lags) and the business cycle indicator (and its 𝑠 
lags). I added some lags for the crossed variables between the cycle and the fiscal shock, that has 
coefficient 𝜃𝑡−𝑠. 𝑑𝑡 are the time dummies with coefficient 𝛽3. Finally, the individual-specific component 
of the error term, 𝑓𝑖, are added. Given that the presence of fixed effects is assumed, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the i.i.d. part 
of the error. 
A dynamic panel model seems to be the best option for this type of analysis because both employment 
rate and real per-capita GDP tend to be persistent. This property is so strong that the employment rate 
DGP can be thought as integrated of order 1 one for most countries (for some countries it is order two), 
with a high correlation to his lagged values, leading to cointegration concerns. Of course, this is not really 
an issue when these equations are estimated for growth rates or cyclical parts, which are usually AR(1) or 
AR(2) processes. This is true also for trend components – i.e. the natural employment rate and the real 
per-capita potential output. In order to take into account the autoregressive nature of the dependent 
variables, I added some lags of them to the regressors. Again, the number of lags is chosen using the 
Akaike Informative Criterion (AIC). 
                                                 
13 A similar procedure is employed by GLP with the AA CAPB measure only for the real GDP. I did it respect to the OECD CAPB 
measure, obtaining similar results for the news in GDP. Moreover, I repeated the experiment for the news in employment. 
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Since the classical estimator techniques for Panel data are significantly biased in presence of 
autocorrelation, this paper makes use of the Aurellano-Bond (1991) estimator, which is one of the most 
used procedures to deal with this issue. Even if it is not the most efficient estimator for panels with a short 
cross-sectional dimension (for instance, the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is more efficient), it is the 
one that had the best fitting and result in the diagnostic tests among the estimators generally used in the 
literature (Anderson Hsiao 1982, Aurellano Bond 1991, Blundell Bond 1998). Nevertheless, in small 
samples (with a time dimension shorter than 30 periods) the estimations would be weakly biased (Chudik, 
Mohaddes, Pesaran and Raissi 2013; Juessen and Linneman 2010; Judson and Owen 1999), that must be 
taken into account when discussing the results. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Testing for hysteresis 
A good starting point for the empirical analysis is checking whether the employment rate behavior is 
affected by hysteresis, since the final aim is to verify whether fiscal policy can trigger such process. 
Although in the literature scholars had implemented a number of tests in order to detect the presence of 
hysteresis in unemployment, the prevailing methodology is to test for the presence of a unit root in time-
series or panel data (Song and Wu 1998).  
Figure 4 Employment rate, cross-sectional units 
 
Notes. The figure reports the employment rate behavior with the solid line for all the cross-sectional units 
At a glance, the employment rate for the single cross-sectional unit (Figure 4) shows a non-stationary 
trend. We can divide countries in three sub-groups: the first (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, 
Japan, Sweden, UK, and US) recollects countries in which the employment rate rose steadily during the 
considered period, and one can presume the presence of a non-stationary process. The dynamic of 
employment rate appears to be flatter in the second group of countries (Australia, Austria, Germany, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), therefore it is more likely that the hypothesis of unit root in the data 
generating process would be rejected. In France and Netherlands the behavior of the variable suggests 
the presence of a structural break, which would undermine the result of a unit root test (Kilian and 
Ohanian 2002). 
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Although a discussion on the characteristic and limits of a unit root test would be highly interesting, it 
is well above the aim of this paper. Following Leon-Ledesma (2002), I control for hysteresis presence in 
employment rate with a simple Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003, from now on IPS) unit root test for panel 
data. In this case, the dynamics of employment will be represented with the following ADF(𝑝𝑖) regression 
without a trend: 
∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (19) 
Where the subscripts refer to country 𝑖 and time 𝑡, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a white noise, ∆𝑒 indicates the employment 
rate first differences, 𝛼𝑖 the country idiosyncratic component. (19) is directly related to equations 
discussed in previous section, as (5): if we think that the output growth as a AR(𝑝𝑖) process, its levels 
should follow a I(1) process. The IPS test is based on the null of non-stationarity for all countries, then 
𝜌𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖. The number of lags 𝑝𝑖  in the ADF is chosen by maximizing the AIC for each single country. As a 
comparison, I tested the non stationarity also through the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002, from now on LLC) bias-
adjusted test, which is a test less powerful since it assumes the same rate of convergence for each cross-
sectional unit. 
The result is reported in Table 4. 
Table 4  
 Panel Unit Root test for employment rate 
 Statistic p-value 
IPS -1.8213 0.0343 
LLC -2.4177 0.0078 
Notes. IPS: Im, Pesaran, and Shin test for unit root in panel data. LLC: Levin, Lin, and Chu test for unit root in panel data, 
bias-adjusted. All test are cross-sectional demeaned to reduce the bias induced by the cross correlation. All tests have 
stationarity as null hypothesis. I set for the AIC maxlag=8. Time period 1980-2010. All countries. 
Not surprisingly, given the different behavior of the employment rate in my units, both the tests reject 
the null hypothesis that all the cross-sectional units have a unit root in the employment rate series. 
Therefore, to understand which units have, and which does not have, a unit root in the employment rate 
dynamic, I tested for non-stationarity in each single cross-sectional unit with a ADF test (the test equation 
is the same in (19) without the subscript 𝑖). 
Table 5 shows the results of the ADF test for each single cross-sectional unit. The data reject the null 
of non-stationarity at the 1% for Netherlands, 5% for Canada and at 10% for Spain. Among the three 
countries, only the result for Spain is completely reliable. The statistical inference for the Netherlands may 
be affected by the presence of a structural break, while the behavior of employment rate appears highly 
non-linear in Canada, making the test inconsistent. 
 
 
Table 5 
Unit Root test for employment rate – Single Country 
Country Statistic p-value Country Statistic p-value 
Australia 0.417903 0.9838 Italy -1.11148 0.6980 
Austria -1.56772 0.4992 Japan -2.25124 0.1883 
Belgium -1.33663 0.6147 Netherlands -3.74093 0.0036 
Canada -2.88312 0.0473 Portugal -0.8143 0.8146 
Denmark -2.35118 0.1560 Spain -2.81596 0.0560 
Finland -1.57217 0.4969 Sweden -1.9406 0.3138 
France -1.6634 0.4500 United Kingdom -1.18845 0.6818 
Germany -1.4086 0.5797 United States -2.217 0.2003 
Ireland -1.53096 0.1883    
Notes. All tests have stationarity as null hypothesis. I set for the AIC maxlag=8. Time period 1980-2010 
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We derive two important information from this preliminary study: first, since the null of non-
stationarity is strongly rejected just for one country, there is an evidence for non-stationarity in the 
employment rate, hence in favor of hysteresis. Second, the presence of hysteresis seems to be 
independent from the labor market characteristics, given that non-stationarity seems to affect 
employment rate behavior in USA as well as Italy, UK, and Germany. This supports the idea that a fiscal 
shock may affect the employment trend even independently from the labor market institutions, at least 
in the considered period. 
 
5.2 SVAR Estimation 
As I discussed above, this SVAR analysis focuses on the effects of a fiscal shock on the trend of the 
employment rate. In order to investigate such effects deeply, this study estimates also the influences of a 
fiscal shock on employment rate growth and on the cyclical component of the employment rate. The 
impulse response functions (IRF) for the employment rate and its components (trend-growth and cyclical) 
are compared with the IRFs for real GDP per capita (growth, potential output growth, and output gap).  
Figure 5 IRF for Employment and real GDP per capita growth rates 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contains full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
The effects of a fiscal shock on employment rate and real per capita GDP are summarized in Figures 
5-7 and Table 6. In all the estimations the shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy, and 
its normalized to be a 1% of GDP at 𝑡 = 1. For the VAR, the AIC suggests 2 lags for both the growth rates 
and cyclical components, while the trend growth model requires 3 lags. In Table 6 is reported the effect 
of a shock after 2 periods. Since the study uses yearly data, this is a good approximation of the fiscal 
multiplier usually computed in the literature (it coincides with the effects of fiscal policy after 12 quarters). 
At a glance, consistently with the GLP’s findings, a fiscal policy has a strong and negative impact on 
real per capita GDP and employment rate. This effect appears to be extremely persistent: as Figure 5 
displays, there is no signal of recovering in employment growth even after four years, while the effect on 
GDP growth is not significant after four periods, and the point estimation stabilizes after two periods, 
beginning to reverse towards the mean from period three. This result is confirmed for the cyclical 
component of the variables (Figure 6): even in this case, while the cyclical employment keeps on reducing, 
the output gap starts to go back after three periods. 
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Figure 6 IRF for Employment and real GDP per capita cyclical component 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
Figure 7 IRF for Employment and real GDP per capita trend growth rates 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
The IRFs for the trend growths support the idea that fiscal policy triggers a hysteresis process in the 
employment rate independent from GDP behaviors. Figure 7 reports the results of fiscal shock for 
employment trend: it is strong and significant even after five years, implying that the trend of employment 
is not reverting to the previous equilibrium, but it is moving toward another equilibrium level. Most 
important, the evidence support the hypothesis that this effect is independent from the potential output 
dynamics: indeed, the impact of a fiscal policy shock on the real GDP per capita trend is never significant 
in these estimations. 
A synoptic view of my results is contained in Table 6, which shows the estimated cumulative effects 
of the fiscal shocks after two years, together with the standard errors. The reported values are a good 
approximation of fiscal multiplier as it provides an easy way to compare easily my results with the ones 
of studies based on quarterly data. In all the estimations, the shock has a significant effect, except for the 
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real GDP trend growth. In particular, the implicit multiplier14 for the GDP is -1.04 while for the employment 
is -1.10. The estimation of the fiscal multiplier for GDP is in the range of multipliers estimated for other 
studies, which do not consider state-dependency, as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ramey (2011). 
However, it seems to be far from GLP’s estimated value, which was about 1.9, and RR’s one, which was 
about 3. In the first case, the difference is probably due to the CAPB series used: GLP uses the AA CAPB 
measure, while my analysis uses the OECD measure. The AA measure better isolates the larger 
consolidation events respect to the OECD measure, leading to higher multipliers. RR, instead, considered 
their narrative measure of fiscal adjustment as exogenous, i.e. they identify the fiscal policy shock with 
their measure of fiscal adjustment. However, as highlighted by Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming), this 
measure may be not completely exogenous and/or affected by measurement errors: then, their results 
would be biased. 
The effect on employment is greater than the effect on GDP, as it was predicted in (6). This estimation 
implies a output elasticity to labor 1 − 𝛾 ≈ 0.948, which is higher than the estimated values in the 
literature. This results may be explained by the fact that while real GDP seems to start recovering after 
two periods, the employment rate keep on declining: this would lead to a larger “total” multiplier, hence 
to an implicit output elasticity to labor more similar to 0.65, which is the standard in level in the literature. 
The multipliers for the trend growth rate of employment and real per capita GDP are, respectively -0.55 
(employment trend) and -0.11 (potential real GDP per capita). This means that about half of the effect on 
employment rate of a fiscal shock is due to movements in the trend component. 
Table 6 
Estimation of the effect of a 1% of GDP CAPB shock in year t=2 
 Growth Cyclical Component Trend Growth 
Employment -1.29*** 
(0.34) 
-0.41*** 
(0.14) 
-0.66*** 
(0.25) 
GDP -1.22*** 
(0.47) 
-0.95*** 
(0.38) 
-0.13 
(0.55) 
Notes. The table reports point estimates with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses obtained via delta method. All specification contain full 
set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy, and its normalized to be a 1% of GDP at 𝒕 = 𝟏.                         
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Some robustness exercises are reported in the Appendix. The results for employment rate are robust 
to changes in the number of lags, to the use of potential output as denominator, and to a restriction in 
the considered shock – I take into account only “large” shocks (>1.5% GDP) – which are supposed to be 
more expansionary (Giavazzi and Pagano 1996). The results for output seem to be more sensitive to those 
changes, in particular for output gap component. In addition, following Turrini 2013, I split my dataset 
between countries with a high level of employment protection and with a low level of employment 
protection15. In this case, only the estimation for the low protection countries confirm the results 
presented here. This suggest that the labor market institution may interfere with the transmission of fiscal 
shocks. 
 
5.3 Extensions 
The effect of composition 
I now examine the effect of a fiscal policy shock disentangling the changes in expenditure from the 
changes in taxation. I defined a shock to be “taxation” or “expenditure” if the tax raise or the spending 
                                                 
14 The multipliers are computed dividing the cumulative effect on the variables for the change in the CAPB, which is 1.17% for 
growth rates and 1.20% for trend growth. Thus, the fiscal multiplier after two years are -1.04 (-1.29/1.17) for the employment rate, 
-1.04 (-1.22/1.17) for the GDP, -0.55 (-0.66/1.20) for the employment trend, and -0.11 (-0.13/1.20) for the potential output. 
15 In order to divide my panel, I considered the OECD indicators of employment protection: when a country is above the mean of 
the whole panel, I consider that as highly protected. If the evidence is mixed – as, for instance, for Finland – I considered other 
variables as the level of minimum wage over the median or the protection of temporary jobs. 
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cut, respectively, were greater than half of the overall fiscal policy. The values of tax raising and spending 
cuts are reported in the Appendix. 
Figure 8 Effects of public expenditure cuts (black line) and taxation increases (red line) 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Shocks on both public expenditure (black) and tax level (red) are normalized to be 1% of GDP. The figure 
reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals, in red dashed lines for taxation and black dash-point lines for expenditure. All specification contain full set 
of country and time fixed effects. The shocks are identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
Figure 8 depicts the IRF for employment (upper three panels) and real per capita GDP (lower three 
panels). Red solid lines are the point estimation for taxation shock, while black solid lines are the point 
estimation for the public expenditure shock. All the shocks are normalized to be a 1% of GDP deviation. 
The specification is a VAR(2) for cyclical component and overall growth and VAR(3) for trend growth. The 
expenditure cut measure is ordered first in the VAR, while taxes are ordered second16, since the level of 
revenues may react immediately to a public expenditure shock, while the effect of an increase in taxation 
on public expenditure should take at least one period. 
The estimations suggest that a reduction of public expenditure has a larger effect on employment rate 
compared with an increase of taxation, while a change in taxation has a stronger effect than expenditure 
on output dynamic. We can find a similar trend also for persistency: usually a cut in expenditure affects 
employment longer, and GDP recovers faster, than when a taxation shock takes place. The evidence for 
employment rate growth is more mixed, since, even if the expenditure shock has a larger effect on impact, 
its persistence is lower than taxation. Both the shocks are not significant when I consider potential output, 
while only expenditure is significant for employment trend. Usually the effects of taxation suffer of a large 
volatility compared with expenditure. 
The results for the real GDP are perfectly in line with a huge literature on the effects of fiscal policy: 
recent studies, as Barro and Redlick (2011) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), suggested that the 
                                                 
16 An experiment with a different order of variables is in the Appendix. There are not remarkable differences when the point 
estimation is significant. 
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taxation shock multiplier should be larger than the spending shock one, because of a smaller crowding-
out effect, and a larger effect on the investment (and saving) decision of private agents. Moreover, 
according to Blanchard and Summers (1987a), a tax increase, especially if focused on the tax wedge, 
should affect also the supply side, driving both the aggregate demand and supply on a lower level of 
output. 
Nevertheless, according with this hypothesis I would expect a stronger, or at least more prolonged, 
effect of taxation also on employment. Instead, Figure 8 suggests that not only expenditure has a stronger 
effect on employment growth, but also it is persistent as taxation shock, having a significant effect even 
on the employment trend – while taxation is not significant –. The explanation of such result may be that, 
since the shock is permanent, a spending cut implies a reduction in public employment. The fired (or not 
hired) public workers are absorbed by the private sector only in the long-run, given that the skill they need 
to get a job in the private sector may not match with the ones that they have (a teacher has to acquire 
new skills to work in a firm). However, if this is true, output should show a response to expenditure cuts 
more prolonged than the one to tax increases. Therefore, the effect on public employment does not offer 
a solid explanation of the different effects of taxation and spending on employment rate and real GDP 
per-capita. 
 
The effect of monetary policy 
The different reactions of output and employment to fiscal policy components may result from the 
conduct of monetary policy. The idea is that monetary policy reacts stronger to a spending cut than to a 
rise in taxation, since monetary authorities interpret the former as a stronger signal of commitment to 
fiscal discipline. Implementing a policy more expansionary, the monetary authority may partially offset 
the negative effects of the fiscal consolidation. If it is the case, the economy activity will recover faster, 
while the employment may be sluggish or even decreasing, since the level of growth above which the 
private sector starts to hire is evaluated to be about 2% a year. In addition, as I have highlighted before, 
fired workers (or not hired) from public employments need a larger time to find new jobs in the private 
sector because the required skills may not match. 
Figure 9 Difference between spending and taxation shock effects – growth rates. 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. The figure reports the differences in the effect of tax increases and spending cuts: with a red solid line for 
real per-capita GDP, a blue dashed line for employment, and a black point-dashed line for the monetary policy rate. Shocks on both public expenditure (cut) and 
tax level (increase) are normalized to be 1% of GDP. All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shocks are identified with the narrative 
change in fiscal policy. Large dots indicate statistically significant difference (p-value less or equal 10%).  
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Figure 10 Difference between spending and taxation shock effects – long-term. 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. The figure reports the differences in the effect of tax increases and spending cuts: with a red solid line for 
real per-capita GDP, a blue dashed line for employment, and a black point-dashed line for the monetary policy rate. Shocks in both public expenditure (cut) and 
tax level (increase) are normalized to be 1% of GDP. All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shocks are identified with the narrative 
change in fiscal policy. Large dots indicate statistically significant difference (p-value less or equal 10%).  
Following GLP, I controlled the behavior of monetary authority adding the policy interest rate to my 
VAR specification. The results are reported in Figures 9 and 10, that show the differences in the effect of 
the two policies for both the short term (Figure 9) and the long term (Figure 10). A positive value of the 
difference implies a larger effect of taxation compared to expenditure, a negative value a larger effect of 
spending shocks. The output suggests that the reaction of the monetary authority is different between 
the two policies, with an expansionary monetary policy following a cut in public expenditure (black point-
dashes line). This result is strong and significant for two periods, as the dots indicate: hence, monetary 
authority tends to be more expansive when the consolidation is implemented cutting public expenditure, 
contrasting efficiently the drop in output, but not in employment rate. 
As Figure 10 shows, the change in monetary policy appears to alter the predominance of the effects 
of a spending cut on the long-term employment rate and to have little and delayed effects on the potential 
output. However, since the effects of both expenditure and taxation are not significant for the potential 
output, this latter result should be inconsistent (and this is true even if the difference is statistically 
significant). 
The Euro-Area after Maastricht 
Figure 11 reports the effect of a fiscal shock in the Euro Area (EA) after the sign of Maastricht Treaty 
(MT), and in Non Euro-Area (NEA) countries during the same period (1992-2010). The Figure displays three 
results: first, the evidence confirms that fiscal policy affects the employment trend without affecting the 
potential output in both subgroups. Second, fiscal policy does not modify significantly the GDP growth in 
both subgroups, as predicted by the theories on expansionary austerity. Third, since a fiscal policy impacts 
only marginally the employment rate in the NEA countries, while the effect is strongly negative within the 
EA, the post-fiscal shock employment growth is puzzling: such a behavior confirms the evidence of the 
literature on jobless recovery (Galì, Smets and Wouters 2012; Gordon 2010; Riggi 2010; Shimer 2010).  
The second result contrasts with previous findings, where output growth reacts negatively to a fiscal 
shock. The change of  sign probably arises from the general reduction of interest rates occurred in Western 
Countries during the ‘90s – reduction that happened also because of the presence of a wide-spread 
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expansionary monetary policy –, which may have sterilized the negative effects of consolidation fiscal 
policy. According to this hypothesis, the larger positive influence of fiscal consolidation for the EA arises 
from the signing of the MT, considered a credible commitment. The different behavior of employment 
rate can be explained with the role of labor market institutions for monetary policy effectiveness. In NEA 
countries – where the protection level of labor market is usually low – fiscal policy does not affect the 
employment rate, while it has a strong negative influence in the EA countries – where the protection of 
jobs is higher. Therefore the more the labor market is protected, the less monetary policy is able to boost 
employment recovery. 
Figure 11 Euro-Area (Left Panel) and Non-Euro Countries (Right Panel) effects of a fiscal shock after 
1992. 
   
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1992-2009. The fiscal shock is normalized to be 1% of GDP. The figures report point estimates and 90% confidence 
intervals. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy. Fixed effects and time dummies added. 
Adding non-linearities 
Table 7 summarizes the estimations on the effects of fiscal policy on output considering that these 
effects may vary along the business cycle. In order to detect the behavior of the fiscal multiplier during 
booms and busts, the Aurellano-Bond (1991) estimator was selected. The role of the business cycle is 
evaluated using the NBER based dummy from the FRED database, which takes value equal one when a 
crisis occur, and zero in normal times. The multidimensional nature of the links between fiscal shocks and 
business cycle has been taken into account by creating interaction variables between shocks and business 
cycle. 
The findings confirm that, in normal times, a fiscal shock has negative effects on employment and 
GDP, and on their components, with a larger and more significant effect on the employment rate. 
However, when a consolidation policy is implemented during recessions, its effects seem to be stronger 
and more protracted for growth rates and trends of variables. However, the impact of fiscal consolidation 
on the cyclical component seems to reduce during crises. This picture is perfectly summarized by the long-
term multiplier, which is reported after the estimations of the single coefficients: in all the regressions the 
multiplier during crises is larger, but not for the cyclical components, where the multipliers decreases. The 
increase in fiscal policy effectiveness is particularly ample for the employment trend, which shows a 
positive long-term multiplier in normal times, which turns strongly negative during crises. 
This larger effect of fiscal policy during crises is an expected result and is in line with a sizeable 
literature on the fiscal multiplier state dependency (Auerback and Gorodnichenko 2012; Baum, Popolaski-
Ribeiro, and Weber 2012; Corsetti, Meier and Muller 2012; Michaillat 2012a/b, Ramey and Zubairy, 
forthcoming). The fact that a fiscal shock may reduce its effectiveness on the cyclical component of 
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variables during crises would be explained by the stronger effect on the trend of those variables. To clear 
it in your mind, try to consider two shocks with the same effect on the employment rate, call them 𝑎 and 
𝑏: if 𝑎 affects the trend of the variable more than 𝑏, the estimated effect of 𝑎 on the cyclical employment 
will be lower than 𝑏, since the overall effect must be the same. In my case, even if the overall effect of 
GDP and employment is larger during recessions, the influence on trends of the variable is strong enough 
to reduce the impact on the cyclical components. 
Table 7  
Estimation of fiscal policy effects controlling for non-linearities 
VARIABLES 
Employment Rate 
Growth 
GDP 
Growth 
Cyclical 
Employment 
Output  
Gap 
Trend 
Employment 
Potential 
Output 
Fiscal Policy -0.764** 
(0.342) 
-0.233 
(0.216) 
-0.199* 
(0.115) 
-0.217 
(0.181) 
-0.221 
(0.154) 
-0.267 
(0.258) 
t-1  Fiscal Policy 0.155 
(0.368) 
0.078 
(0.267) 
-0.123 
(0.123) 
0.111 
(0.211) 
0.124 
(0.211) 
-0.133 
(0.391) 
t-2   Fiscal Policy 0.436 
(0.320) 
0.194 
(0.239) 
0.017 
(0.113) 
0.075 
(0.207) 
0.185 
(0.194) 
0.001 
(0.398) 
t-3 Fiscal Policy 0.066 
(0.330) 
-0.150 
(0.287) 
-0.136 
(0.120) 
-0.199 
(0.216) 
0.170 
(0.155) 
-0.250 
(0.391) 
Fiscal Policy * Recession 0.103 
(0.626) 
0.239 
(0.309) 
-0.028 
(0.203) 
0.086 
(0.224) 
-0.108 
(0.381) 
0.656 
(0.474) 
t-1 Fiscal Policy * Recession -0.067 
(0.389) 
-0.384 
(0.274) 
0.203 
(0.132) 
-0.261 
(0.203) 
-0.247 
(0.215) 
-0.386 
(0.405) 
t-2 Fiscal Policy * Recession -0.596* 
(0.312) 
0.166 
(0.246) 
0.100 
(0.121) 
0.290 
(0.224) 
-0.298* 
(0.171) 
-0.073 
(0.401) 
t-3 Fiscal Policy * Recession -0.428 
(0.416) 
-0.082 
(0.319) 
0.009 
(0.143) 
0.051 
(0.263) 
-0.295 
(0.219) 
0.367 
(0.402) 
t-1 Dependent 0.614*** 
(0.096) 
0.589*** 
(0.054) 
0.692*** 
(0.116) 
1.129*** 
(0.055) 
0.604*** 
(0.076) 
0.760*** 
(0.044) 
t-2 Dependent -0.099 
(0.105)  
-0.135 
(0.088) 
-0.503*** 
(0.062)   
Business Cycle 0.519* 
(0.265) 
-1.216*** 
(0.176) 
0.146 
(0.090) 
-0.731*** 
(0.171) 
0.207 
(0.140) 
-0.285 
(0.241) 
long term multiplier 
(se) 
-0.22 
(1.29) 
-0.27 
(1.11) 
-0.99* 
(0.57) 
-0.62 
(1.05) 
0.65 
(1.07) 
-2.71 
(2.35) 
long term multiplier crises 
(se) 
-0.44 
(2.58) 
-0.42 
(0.71) 
-0.36 
(0.47) 
-0.18 
(0.68) 
-1.74 
(1.25) 
-0.358 
(1.99) 
Observations 451 451 451 451 451 451 
R-squared -0.05 0.67 0.41 0.77 0.15 0.682 
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. using 451 observations. 17 cross-sectional units are included. Time-series length: minimum 
23, maximum 27, starting 1980 and ending 2010. Estimation method. 1-step dynamic panel (Arellano Bond 1991). The fiscal policy shock and its lags are considered 
as exogenous and used as instruments. 
Legend. Employment Rate Growth: the dependent variable is the growth of employment rate; Cyclical Employment: the dependent variable is computed as the 
difference between the actual employment rate and the NAIRE; Trend Employment: the dependent variable is the growth rates of my NAIRE; GDP Growth: the 
dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per-capita; Output Gap: the dependent variable is the output gap; Potential Output: the dependent variable is 
the growth rate of potential GDP computed from output gap and real GDP.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study covers some open issues within the literature on the fiscal multiplier, focusing on the impact 
and the persistency of a contractionary fiscal policy shock on the job creation process, and discussing the 
presence of a hysteresis process in the employment behavior. The general relation between fiscal shocks 
and employment rate (the so-called “fiscal multiplier”), the short-run relation (the so-called “Okun’s law”), 
and the long-run relation (the so-called “hysteresis”), is analyzed via a SVAR estimation. The study also 
investigates whether taxation and expenditure have different effects on the economy, evaluates the role 
of monetary policy, and controls the relation between fiscal shocks and business cycle. The results on 
employment are compared with the ones for real per capita GDP in order to understand to which extent 
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those effects are different from the one on employment, with particular attention to the presence of 
hysteresis in employment rate. 
The study verifies the presence of hysteresis in employment rate with a unit root test. In agreement 
with Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987a 1987b) and Delong and Summers (2012), the analysis found 
evidence in favor of the presence of a hysteresis process. Then, a Panel SVAR was estimated exploiting a 
new methodology to identify shocks, similar to the one of Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014), Ramey 
(2011), and Mertens and Ravn (2013 and forthcoming). This methodology consists in two steps: first, by 
demeaning each cross-sectional unit the analysis can deal with panel data as a unique time-series of 527 
observations from a single country. Second, the analysis used the dataset of predetermined changes in 
fiscal policy as an instrumental variable for the changes in the Cyclical Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) 
of government, which is usually the benchmark variable for the analysis on the short-term effects of fiscal 
policy. 
The IRFs suggest that fiscal policy may affect employment trend without modify the potential output 
behavior. Hence, a fiscal policy shock triggers a hysteresis process in employment, having a highly 
persistent effect on the job creation process. As a consequence, the fiscal policy may affect the 
equilibrium level of employment, and statistical inference based only on the analysis of employment 
cyclical component may be biased because of the employment trend movements. Surprisingly, my data 
suggest that a change in public expenditure is more likely to produce hysteresis than a shock in taxation, 
which affects more the potential output. Such a result cannot be totally explained considering both that 
expenditure directly affect employment – since a large number of workers are employed in public 
institutions – and that those shocks are permanent. 
Instead, the evidence advocates that a possible explanation of lower responsiveness of GDP to an 
expenditure cut – compared with the effectiveness of tax increases – is that monetary authority reacts 
differently to a consolidation obtained cutting expenditure respect to one achieved raising tax. As a matter 
of fact, the study investigates to what extent the reaction of monetary policy is different between the two 
types of fiscal shock, finding out that monetary authorities implement a policy more expansionary after a 
cut in expenditure. Such reaction seems to reduce the effects of expenditure cuts on both real GDP growth 
and employment trend. This result is in line with a sizable literature, which suggests that central bankers 
will implement a more expansionary policy when the consolidation is obtained via a spending cut, as they 
believe that this fiscal policy implies more commitment from the government. 
The estimations for fiscal multipliers are in line with the literature: I found an overall fiscal multiplier 
of -1.04 for the real per capita GDP and of -1.10 for the employment rate: has expected the effects on 
GDP are smaller than the ones on employment. The fiscal multiplier for employment trend is -0.55, while 
is -0.11 for potential real GDP per capita. Therefore, the impact on the employment trend accounts for 
almost one-half of the multiplier for the overall employment: such a result implies that the inference 
obtained taking into account only the cyclical component is misleading. 
The role of business cycle is investigated by employing dynamic panel regressions. The findings are 
mixed: when a crisis occurs, the multipliers for the growth rates and the trend spike, while the opposite 
is true for the cyclical component. This happens because the change in the equilibrium level of real GDP 
and employment due to fiscal shocks is large enough to reduce the estimated impact of fiscal policy on 
the cyclical components. This evidence partially confirms the recent literature on the fiscal multiplier 
(Auerback and Gorodnichenko 2012; Baum, Popolaski-Ribeiro, and Weber 2012; Corsetti, Meier and 
Muller 2012; Michaillat 2012a/b). When I considered a smaller dataset, i.e. the after-Maastricht period 
for both the Euro-Area and Non-Euro countries, the ability of fiscal policy to produce a hysteresis process 
is confirmed. However, the presence of different reactions between the subgroups to a fiscal shock of 
output growth and employment rate growth, suggests that the role of monetary policy and interest rate, 
together with labor market institutions, may be crucial. This effect should be deep by future researches. 
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APPENDIX 
  ROBUSTNESS 
 
Figure 12 IRF Large Consolidations (>1.5% GDP) 
 
Notes: data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy, considering only consolidation 
larger than 1.5% GDP, following Giavazzi and Pagano 1990 [expected to be more expansionary].  
Figure 13 IRF for Employment and real GDP – 1 Lag 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
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Figure 14 IRF for Employment and real GDP – Growth and Cyclical VAR(3); Trend VAR (2) 
 
Notes: data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
 
 
 
Figure 15 IRF for Employment and real GDP – 4 lags 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. 
All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
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Figure 16 IRF for Employment and real GDP Excluding Ireland and Germany 
 
Notes. Data are for 15 countries, period 1980-2009. I excluded Germany and Ireland. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates 
and 90% confidence intervals. All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 High Employment Protection Level 
 
Notes. Data are for high employment protection level countries [Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden], period 
1985-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. All specification contain time fixed effects. 
The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy. 
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Figure 18 Low Employment Protection Level 
 
Notes. Data are for low employment protection level countries [Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, UK, US], period 1985-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB 
of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. All specification contain time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the 
narrative change in fiscal policy.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 IRF with Potential Output as Denominator 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Effect of a raise in CAPB of the 1% of GDP. The figure reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals, 
in red dashed lines for taxation and black dash-point lines for expenditure. All specification contain full set of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified 
with the narrative change in fiscal policy.  
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Figure 20 Effects of public expenditure changes (red line) and taxation changes (black line) – Different 
ordering of variables 
 
Notes. Data are for all 17 countries, period 1980-2009. Shocks in both public expenditure (red) and tax level (black) are normalized to be 1% of GDP. The figure 
reports point estimates and 90% confidence intervals, in red dashed lines for expenditure and black dash-point lines for taxation. All specification contain full set 
of country and time fixed effects. The shock is identified with the narrative change in fiscal policy. 
DATASET 
 
The database, which is reported above, identifies fiscal consolidation measures examining 
policymakers’ intentions and actions as described in contemporaneous policy documents, recognizing the 
measures motivated primarily by deficit reduction. As GLP explained: “(…) such fiscal actions represent a 
response to past decisions and economic conditions rather than to prospective conditions. As a result, 
they are unlikely to be systematically correlated with other developments affecting output in the short 
term, and are thus valid for estimating the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation”17. As the 
authors argue this avoids the large part of the problems related to the identification of fiscal policy 
consolidation using a statistical concept such as the increase in CAPB18. Figure reports the relation 
between the change in CAPB and the GLP measure of fiscal policy, while it is compared to OECD CAPB in 
Figure 21. 
                                                 
17 The historical sources examined by the authors include Budget Reports, Budget Speeches, central bank reports, Convergence 
and Stability Programs submitted by the authorities to the European Commission, IMF reports and OECD Economic Surveys. In 
addition, country-specific sources are examined, such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports and the Economic Report 
of the President for the United States, the Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise for France, Ministry of Finance press releases 
and publications, and, in one case, and a transcript of a television interview. These documents provide evidence of what 
policymakers believed at the time that decisions were taken, as well as the budgetary impact of the measures. Based on this 
approach, the sample includes 173 fiscal policy adjustments in 17 OECD economies between 1978 and 2009, reported in percentage 
change of public expenditure and/or taxation respect to GDP. The data are presented at an annual frequency. The countries included 
in my sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
18 For a comparison between this dataset and the CAPB, see Guajardo Leigh and Pescatori 2013 
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Figure 21 Difference in change in OECD CAPB VS GLP Measure of Narrative Shocks 
 
Notes. Figure reports difference the two measure of change in fiscal policy in a scatter plot. In the figure, is selected the component of OECD CAPB directly related 
to a fiscal consolidation, and the principal discrepancies between the two measure are reported. This figure is directly related to the GLP one which reports the 
main discrepancies with the AA CAPB measure 
Figure 22 Narrative measure and OECD CAPB 
 
Notes. Figure reports the two measure of change in fiscal policy for each cross-sectional observation.  
The use of a narrative-based dataset raises two important concerns. Primarily, as highlighted by 
Cloyne (2013), this dataset appeals to the Romer and Romer (2010, RR)’s argument that actions to 
contrast deficit or reduce public debt are exogenous. However, not all these types of actions are truly 
exogenous: indeed the UK data collected by Devries, Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2011) cover both 
Cloyne (2013)’s exogenous and endogenous deficit categories. Moreover, as GLP underlined, the shocks 
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are note truly exogenous. In this sense, a critique as the one of Leeper (1997) on RR’s narrative dataset 
for monetary shocks still applies, and the measure would fail a Granger-causality test. The other crucial 
issue of an action-based variable is the collection of data itself: this type of dataset are very time-
consuming to be updated or enlarged adding new countries and variables. 
Even if it is challenging to deal with these two fundamental issues, I have to emphasize that, at the 
best of my knowledge, all datasets on fiscal shocks suffer of endogeneity problems. However, an action 
based such as Devries, Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2011)’s one is a step forward in addressing the 
endogeneity problem, since I have to consider that it collects data for a large panel of countries, and some 
simplifications are needed as opposed to when scholars collect data for only one country, as RR and 
Cloyne (2013). Moreover, as GLP discuss in their paper – section 2.3 –, not only their measure is fairly 
better than CAPB in identifying the size of the consolidation, but also it is orthogonal to unexpected 
movements in output, as I verified in my study. Hence, even if it is not exogenous, I can consider this 
changes in fiscal policy as predetermined which it is all I need to conduct my analysis without statistical 
concerns. On the other hand, I am optimistic that, since action-based dataset are now an essential 
instrument to analyze a wide range of macroeconomic topics, future researches will update and extend 
these datasets. 
 
Narrative Fiscal Shocks  
Country Year Impact Country Year Impact Country Year Impact Country Year Impact 
AUS 1985 0.45 DEU 1984 0.18 FRA 2000 -0.2 NLD 1982 1.71 
AUS 1986 1.02 DEU 1991 1.11 GBR 1979 0.27 NLD 1983 3.24 
AUS 1987 0.9 DEU 1992 0.46 GBR 1980 0.08 NLD 1984 1.76 
AUS 1988 0.1 DEU 1993 0.11 GBR 1981 1.58 NLD 1985 1.24 
AUS 1994 0.25 DEU 1994 0.91 GBR 1982 0.53 NLD 1986 1.74 
AUS 1995 0.5 DEU 1995 1.08 GBR 1994 0.83 NLD 1987 1.48 
AUS 1996 0.62 DEU 1997 1.6 GBR 1995 0.28 NLD 1988 0.06 
AUS 1997 0.7 DEU 1998 -0.1 GBR 1996 0.3 NLD 1991 0.87 
AUS 1998 0.37 DEU 1999 0.3 GBR 1997 0.69 NLD 1992 0.74 
AUS 1999 0.04 DEU 2000 0.7 GBR 1998 0.31 NLD 1993 0.12 
AUT 1980 0.8 DEU 2003 0.74 GBR 1999 0.21 NLD 2004 1.7 
AUT 1981 1.56 DEU 2004 0.4 IRL 1982 2.8 NLD 2005 0.5 
AUT 1984 2.04 DEU 2006 0.5 IRL 1983 2.5 PRT 1983 2.3 
AUT 1996 2.41 DEU 2007 0.9 IRL 1984 0.29 PRT 2000 0.5 
AUT 1997 1.56 DNK 1983 2.77 IRL 1985 0.12 PRT 2002 1.6 
AUT 2001 1.02 DNK 1984 2.38 IRL 1986 0.74 PRT 2003 -0.75 
AUT 2002 0.55 DNK 1985 1.54 IRL 1987 1.65 PRT 2005 0.6 
BEL 1982 1.66 DNK 1986 -0.72 IRL 1988 1.95 PRT 2006 1.65 
BEL 1983 1.79 DNK 1995 0.3 IRL 2009 4.74 PRT 2007 1.4 
BEL 1984 0.69 ESP 1983 1.9 ITA 1991 2.77 SWE 1984 0.9 
BEL 1985 1.61 ESP 1984 1.12 ITA 1992 3.5 SWE 1993 1.81 
BEL 1987 2.8 ESP 1989 1.22 ITA 1993 4.49 SWE 1994 0.78 
BEL 1990 0.6 ESP 1990 -0.4 ITA 1994 1.43 SWE 1995 3.5 
BEL 1992 1.79 ESP 1992 0.7 ITA 1995 4.2 SWE 1996 2 
BEL 1993 0.92 ESP 1993 1.1 ITA 1996 0.34 SWE 1997 1.5 
BEL 1994 1.15 ESP 1994 1.6 ITA 1997 1.82 SWE 1998 1 
BEL 1996 1 ESP 1995 0.74 ITA 1998 0.68 USA 1978 0.14 
BEL 1997 0.91 ESP 1996 1.3 ITA 2004 1.3 USA 1980 0.06 
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CAN 1984 0.27 ESP 1997 1.2 ITA 2005 1 USA 1981 0.23 
CAN 1985 1.03 FIN 1992 0.91 ITA 2006 1.39 USA 1985 0.21 
CAN 1986 0.99 FIN 1993 3.71 ITA 2007 1.03 USA 1986 0.1 
CAN 1987 0.28 FIN 1994 3.46 JPN 1979 0.12 USA 1988 0.85 
CAN 1988 0.3 FIN 1995 1.65 JPN 1980 0.21 USA 1990 0.33 
CAN 1989 0.31 FIN 1996 1.47 JPN 1981 0.43 USA 1991 0.58 
CAN 1990 0.86 FIN 1997 0.23 JPN 1982 0.71 USA 1992 0.52 
CAN 1991 0.4 FRA 1979 0.85 JPN 1983 0.42 USA 1993 0.32 
CAN 1992 0.21 FRA 1987 0.26 JPN 1997 1.43 USA 1994 0.9 
CAN 1993 0.35 FRA 1989 -0.2 JPN 1998 0.48 USA 1995 0.53 
CAN 1994 0.49 FRA 1991 0.25 JPN 2003 0.48 USA 1996 0.29 
CAN 1995 0.99 FRA 1992 -0.1 JPN 2004 0.64 USA 1997 0.3 
CAN 1996 0.97 FRA 1995 0.28 JPN 2005 0.28 USA 1998 0.15 
CAN 1997 0.47 FRA 1996 1.33 JPN 2006 0.72    
DEU 1982 1.18 FRA 1997 0.5 JPN 2007 0.15    
DEU 1983 0.87 FRA 1999 -0.1 NLD 1981 1.75    
 
